UNDP'S ONLINE COURSE ON ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES

This grouping covers a very wide range of ACAs with different structures, institutional positioning and levels of independence. Their commonality is that they only have prevention functions, with no investigation or prosecution functions. Some of these agencies are Commissions of high-level officials, whose work focuses on defining strategic objectives and priorities, as well as on the coordination of governmental action against corruption. Examples of this type are the Anti-Corruption Council of Armenia, Algeria’s National Agency for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption, and the Commission on Combating Corruption of Azerbaijan. In some countries, a unit within a Ministry of Government or a Multi-Agency Working Group may be tasked with such anti-corruption coordination and priority setting functions. Some preventive agencies have a more substantive role and are equipped with a Secretariat. They are responsible for operational activities generally related to education/training and enforcing public administration legislation and regulations. Examples of this latter type are the Commission for Corruption Prevention of Slovenia, the State Commission for Prevention of Corruption of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative of Montenegro and France’s Central Services for Prevention of Corruption. Some Ombudsmen also perform these functions, such as the Ombudsmen of Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, which both have education mandates as well as responsibility for overseeing their national Leadership Codes.

Some ACAs are specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement. These agencies have prosecutorial authority in corruption cases and sometimes also have investigative structures and functions. It is not uncommon for some of these agencies to also have a small corruption prevention department, and in general they will work with other anti-corruption agencies to support prevention activities, for example by providing research, statistical analysis and/or legislative inputs. Agencies particularly representative of this model are the Romanian National Anti-Corruption Directorate, the Croatian Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, the Special Investigation Unit of South Africa, the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime, the Central Office for the Repression of Corruption in Belgium, the United Kingdom Metropolitan Police/Anti-corruption Command, the Vietnam State Inspectorate and the Lao PDR State Inspectorate. In some countries, special units within the Department of the Public Prosecutor may perform this function. In Palau, legislation establishes a Special Prosecutor with a specific mandate to prosecute corruption offenses.

A common type of ACA model, inspired by the Hong Kong Independent Commission against Corruption and Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, combines prevention and enforcement functions, undertaking policy development, analysis and technical assistance in prevention, public outreach and information dissemination and investigation. Notably, in most cases, prosecution remains a separate function. The following are examples of the so-called “Hong Kong model” ACAs: the Mongolia Independent Authority Against Corruption; the Maldives Anti-Corruption Commission, the Timor-Leste Anti-Corruption Commission; the Lithuanian Special Investigation Service; the Latvian Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau; the Independent Commission against Corruption in New South Wales, Australia; Anti-Corruption Commission of Jordan; Botswana Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime; and the Ugandan Inspector General of Government. The Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) includes prevention, education, investigation and prosecution functions within its overall mandate. A number of other ACAs have adopted elements of the Hong Kong and Singapore models, but follow them less rigorously, for example in Argentina and Ecuador.

In some countries, and particularly those with limited resources, some form of multi-purpose accountability institution may be established instead of a dedicated ACA. These bodies often perform a mix of human rights, anti-corruption and/or Ombudsman mandates. In some countries, Supreme Audit Institutions also perform certain corruption prevention and investigation functions. Often, these bodies are not called ACAs, but nonetheless include key anti-corruption activities within their mandates. Such multi-purpose institutions are particularly common in small island states, such as those in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. Notably, the Government of South Korea also decided recently to merge three institutions to form one Korean Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, and Ghana has a Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, which also covers anti-corruption within its mandate. As these agencies take up several mandates, they can be designated as “multi-purpose accountability institutions,” because they take on different roles depending on the type of complaint they are dealing with. They may either provide human rights protection, Ombudsman services or engage in anti-corruption activities depending on the case.

Commissions of Inquiry can be established to investigate a range of issues, including corruption. Such Commissions are usually established in times of democratic transition, following a coup d’état, a popular uprising or elections resulting in a peaceful transition. They are usually established for a limited period, such as a designated transition period or until they have exhausted all cases. Usually, these Commissions of Inquiry have a retroactive mandate, meaning they only look at acts committed under a previous regime and are not forward-looking. They have law enforcement powers, but sometimes also have preventive mandates, such as developing anti-corruption policies. In recent years, Commissions of Inquiry have been set up in a number of countries. In 2011, Tunisia set up the National Fact-Finding Committee on Bribery and Corruption; in 2010, Niger set up the Commission de Lutte contre la Délinquance Economique, Financière et Fiscale et pour la Promotion de la Bonne Gouvernance dans la Gestion des Biens Publics; in 2009, the Maldives set up the Presidential Commission Against Corruption; and in 1996, Tanzania set up the Presidential Commission Against Corruption.